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   BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS 
 MASSACHUSETTS AND NEW JERSEY 
 
  Both this case and Browner v. American Trucking 
Associations, Inc., No. 99-1257, to be heard in tandem, arise 
out of challenges brought by cross-petitioners to the EPA’s 
promulgation of revised National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS) for particulate matter (PM) and ozone.  
Both cases, moreover, concern the validity of EPA’s 
construction of the Clean Air Act that underlies the revised 
PM and ozone NAAQS.   In No. 99-1257, cross-petitioners 
(filing there as respondents) contend that EPA’s construction 
of the Clean Air Act violates the nondelegation doctrine.  In 
this case, cross-petitioners contend that the Clean Air Act 
itself bars EPA’s longstanding position that the statute 
precludes the agency from considering costs in setting the 
NAAQS. 
 Cross-petitioners seek to link the two cases by claiming 
that the source of the Clean Air Act’s constitutional infirmity 
is EPA’s refusal to interpret the Act to allow for the 
consideration of costs in setting the NAAQS.   Cross-
petitioners thus attempt to persuade this Court to reject 
EPA’s interpretation of the Act by invoking the canon that 
courts should construe statutes so as to avoid invalidating 
them on constitutional grounds. 
 In our brief filed in No. 99-1257, however, we have 
established the absence of any merit to cross-petitioners’ 
claim of undue delegation.  Brief of Respondents 
Massachusetts and New Jersey, Browner v. American 
Trucking Assns., at 20-24 (MA & NJ Br.).  Because cross-
petitioners have so closely linked their statutory argument in 
this case to their constitutional argument in No. 99-1257, the 
former should fall based on the weakness of the latter.  A 
wholly insubstantial constitutional argument can never be a 
legitimate basis for rejecting an otherwise valid agency 
statutory interpretation.  But that is especially so where, as in 
this case, cross-petitioners’ proffered interpretation would 
not avoid the constitutional problem as they see it. 
 There are, moreover, no other possible bases for 
upsetting EPA’s unbroken position that the Clean Air Act 
 allows both EPA and the States to consider costs in 
implementing the NAAQS, but does not allow EPA to 
consider costs in setting the NAAQS in the first instance.  
The plain meaning of the statutory language permits no 
other conclusion.  And, contrary to the gloomy exaggerations 
of cross-petitioners  and their supporters, the many decades 
of federal air pollution regulation confirm the wisdom of 
Congress’s deliberate and carefully crafted choices about 
precisely how costs should be considered in protecting the 
quality of the nation’s air. 
 
 STATEMENT 
 
A.  Statutory and Regulatory Background 
 
 The NAAQS form the centerpiece of the Clean Air Act. 
They protect public health by governing the quality of the 
nation’s outdoor air.  These standards are not, however, self-
implementing; they do not themselves directly apply to any 
source of air pollution.  They apply instead directly only to 
those federal and state governmental authorities responsible 
for ensuring that the standards are met.  For that reason, 
while the NAAQS are “standards” in name, they are more 
akin to statutory policy objectives in their actual operation. 
 Federal and state authorities are statutorily obliged to 
develop a series of implementing measures designed to 
achieve compliance with the NAAQS.  The Clean Air Act 
itself mandates some of those implementing measures and 
their respective timetables.  The design and application of 
other implementing measures are left to the discretion of the 
appropriate federal or state governmental authority.  
 A fundamental distinction between the statutory factors 
relevant to the setting of a NAAQS and the statutory factors 
relevant to implementing measures designed to achieve a 
NAAQS is central to the operation of the Act.  Congress 
deliberately and carefully decided to apply different 
requirements to the very different regulatory tasks of setting 
regulatory objectives and designing implementing measures.  
In particular, Congress concluded that while costs and 
related practicality and feasibility concerns should be 
 considered in a variety of ways in implementing the NAAQS, 
they should not be considered in setting them. 
 During the last three decades of experience with the 
Clean Air Act, Congress has steadfastly maintained that 
essential distinction.  Congress has repeatedly amended the 
Act in both isolated and more sweeping ways to provide for 
more or less consideration of costs and feasibility in aspects 
of the statute concerned with implementation of the NAAQS. 
These changes sometimes reflect congressional response to 
new knowledge and, other times, simply to changing political 
priorities.  Yet, throughout these same thirty years, many of 
which were marked by considerable controversy over the 
costs of environmental protection, Congress has not once 
altered the basic format for setting the NAAQS, a format that 
from the very beginning has excluded the consideration of 
costs.    
 
 Setting the NAAQS 
 
 Sections 108 and 109 of the Clean Air Act require the 
Administrator of EPA to establish and periodically revise 
NAAQS for a limited subset of air pollutants.  See  42 U.S.C.  
7408-7409.  Section 108 provides that NAAQS may be set 
only for air pollutants that “cause or contribute to air pollution 
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare” and “the presence of which in the ambient 
air results from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary 
sources.” See 42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(1)(A)-(B).  Accordingly, the 
Administrator may regulate a pollutant under the NAAQS 
program only if she first finds that its widespread presence in 
the ambient air poses a threat to public health or welfare. 
 The Clean Air Act provides for the establishment of both 
“primary” and “secondary” NAAQS.  The essential distinction 
between the two is that primary NAAQS “protect the  public 
health” while secondary NAAQS “protect the public welfare.”  
More particularly, Section 109(b)(1) of the Act defines the 
primary NAAQS as: 
ambient air quality standards the attainment and 
maintenance of which in the judgment of the 
Administrator, based on such criteria and allowing an 
 adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the 
public health.  
42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1) (emphasis added).  A secondary 
NAAQS is defined as: 
a level of air quality the attainment and maintenance of 
which in the judgment of the Administrator, based on such 
criteria, is requisite to protect the public welfare from any 
known or anticipated effects associated with the presence 
of such air pollutant in the ambient air. 
42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(2) (emphasis added).  For each standard, 
therefore, the Act directs the Administrator to exercise her 
“judgment” based on specific “criteria” with the added 
requirement for primary NAAQS that the Administrator also 
allow for “an adequate margin of safety.”    
 Section 108(a)(2)  further details the precise content of 
the air quality “criteria” on which the NAAQS must be based.  
These criteria must: 
reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating 
the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on public 
health and welfare which may be expected from the 
presence of such pollutant in the ambient air, in varying 
quantities. 
42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(2).  Thus, the only “effects” that are 
relevant under the prescribed criteria are those expected 
from the pollutant’s “presence . . . in the ambient air.” 
  Finally, Section 109(d)(1) of the Clean Air Act directs the 
Administrator to review the criteria and NAAQS every five 
years.  42 U.S.C. 7409(d)(1).  Based on this review, the 
Administrator may promulgate a new NAAQS or revise an 
existing one. 42 U.S.C. 7409(a)(1).  The criteria relevant to 
the decisions whether and how to revise an existing NAAQS 
are the same as the criteria, described in section 108, for 
establishing a NAAQS in the first instance.  Id. 
  
 Implementing the NAAQS 
 
 A NAAQS does not, standing alone, directly regulate any 
source of air pollution.  It instead simply establishes a 
statutory objective that the Clean Air Act makes federal and 
state governmental regulatory authorities responsible for 
 achieving within a series of prescribed timetables.  Hence, 
while Sections 108 and 109 govern the setting of NAAQS, 
including their subsequent revision, other Clean Air Act 
statutory provisions govern the implementation of the 
NAAQS.  
 Section 110 of the Act, for instance, provides for the 
development by states and, if necessary, by the federal 
government, of state or federal “implementation plans” (SIPs 
or FIPs) that provide for the “implementation, maintenance, 
and enforcement” of NAAQS throughout each state.  42 
U.S.C. 7410(a)(1).  While section 110 details a host of 
requirements for these plans, including the control of 
stationary sources “as necessary to assure that [NAAQS] 
are achieved[,]”1 the overarching requirement is that the 
implementation plan, as a whole, make the necessary 
progress toward NAAQS compliance.  “Perhaps the most 
important forum for consideration of claims of economic and 
technological infeasibility is before the state agency 
formulating the implementation plan.  So long as the national 
standards are met, the State may select whatever mix of 
control devices it desires, . . . and industries with particular 
economic or technological problems may seek special 
treatment in the plan itself.”  Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 
U.S. 246, 266 (1975). 
 Other provisions of the Clean Air Act specifically 
concerned with implementation, moreover, expressly provide 
for the consideration of costs.   For instance, section 111 
provides for EPA’s promulgation of technology-based 
standards of performance applicable to new stationary 
sources of air pollutants, including pollutants governed by 
the NAAQS.  Those performance standards must “tak[e] into 
account the cost of achieving such reduction and any nonair 
quality health and environmental impact and energy 
requirements.”  42 U.S.C. 7411(a).  Federal emissions 
standards applicable to mobile sources and aircraft, many of 
which emit NAAQS pollutants, likewise mandate taking costs 
into account.  See 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(3)(A)(i); 42 U.S.C. 
                                                 
142 U.S.C. 7410(a)(2)(C). 
 
 7571(b). 
 The nonattainment provisions of the Clean Air Act, which 
apply to those parts of the nation not yet in attainment with 
NAAQS, similarly reflect significant attention to costs and 
technological feasibility.  The touchstone for “nonattainment 
plans” designed to achieve the NAAQS is “reasonableness” 
in the form of “reasonable further progress” towards attaining 
the NAAQS.   42 U.S.C. 7501(1), 42 U.S.C. 7502(c)(2).  The 
Act does not require the immediate attainment of the 
NAAQS, regardless of the economic costs of such a 
requirement, notwithstanding the passage long ago of 
previous statutory deadlines.  Nonattainment plans must 
instead provide for “reasonably available control measures” 
and new and modified major stationary sources must, 
among other things, achieve the “lowest achievable emission 
rate,” which explicitly excludes limitations “that are not 
achievable.” 42 U.S.C. 7502(c)(1), 7503(a)(2), 7501(3)(A).  
The Act also allows EPA to construe the term “source” for 
the purposes of these nonattainment requirements to allow a 
facility to avoid costlier controls by reducing air pollution in 
one part of a manufacturing site more than it increases 
pollution in another part of the site.   See Chevron U.S.A. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866 
(1984). 
 
  History of the Clean Air Act and NAAQS 
Program 
 
 The Clean Air Act today embodies no fewer than eleven 
separate Acts of Congress, stretching back over fifty years.2  
A central part of the legislative debates surrounding each of 
these enactments has been the extent to which regulatory 
objectives should turn on public health and welfare concerns 
as well as the extent to which the regulatory means of 
achieving those objectives should turn on considerations of 
economic cost or technological feasibility.  With regard to 
implementation, Congress has made numerous extremely 
precise and significant refinements in the statutory language 
relating to where, when, and to what extent costs should be 
relevant in establishing pollution control requirements 
applicable to individual sources of air pollution.  By contrast, 
Congress has, for three decades, steadfastly adhered to the 
fundamental position, reflected in sections 108 and 109 of 
the Clean Air Act, that any such cost considerations should 
not similarly play any role in the setting of the air quality 
criteria and standards that have always served as the 
objectives of federal air pollution legislation.  
 Congress first addressed the question of what “criteria” 
should be relevant to setting air quality standards in the 
original 1963 Clean Air Act.3  The 1963 statute authorized 
the federal government–acting through the Secretary of the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)–to 
establish “criteria” for air quality.  77 Stat. 392 § 3(c)(2).  The 
language describing the scope and content of the original air 
quality criteria is strikingly similar to the corresponding 
language of the Clean Air Act today.4 Although Congress 
                                                 
2See William H. Rodgers, Environmental Law 124 (2d ed. 1994). 
 
3See Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392. 
 
4The statute provided: 
4Whenever [the Secretary] determines that there is a particular air 
pollution agent (or combination of agents), present in the air in 
certain quantities, producing effects harmful to the health or 
welfare of persons, the Secretary shall compile and publish criteria 
 used the same term, “criteria,” for both the scientific 
information on the consequences of air pollution and  
standards for air quality,5  the goal of the standards was 
clear: the Secretary was to recommend to local, state, or 
interstate air pollution control agencies those standards 
which “in [the Secretary’s] judgment may be necessary to 
protect the public health and welfare.”6 
 In the Air Quality Act of 1967, Congress used language 
virtually identical to that in the 1963 Act in again directing the 
Secretary of HEW to establish air quality criteria.7  The 1967 
Act also introduced some of the language that now governs 
the NAAQS themselves: the Act directed the Secretary to 
issue “such criteria of air quality as in his judgment may be 
requisite for the protection of the public health and welfare.”8  
Nevertheless, Congress continued to rely mostly on the 
states for the development of rules governing air quality 
(standards) while relying on the federal government for the 
development of the scientific documents on which the 
standards were to depend (criteria). 
 It was not until the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 that  
Congress provided the federal government with the 
                                                                                                    
reflecting accurately the latest scientific knowledge useful in 
indicating the kind and extent of such effects which may be 
expected from the presence of such air pollutant agent (or 
combination of agents) in the air in varying quantities. 
§ (3)(c)(2), 77 Stat. at 395; cf. 42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(2). 
 
5See § 3(c)(3), 77 Stat. at 395. 
 
6Id. 
 
7The criteria were to reflect “the latest scientific knowledge useful 
in indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on health 
and welfare which may be expected from the presence of an air 
pollution agent, or combination of agents in the ambient air, in 
varying quantities.” Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 
sec. 107(b)(2), § 2, 81 Stat. 485, 491.    
 
§8 107(b)(1), 81 Stat. at 491. 
 
 exclusive authority to set nationally uniform standards for air 
quality. The states retained the task of implementing the air 
quality standards, but EPA–created during Congress’s 
deliberations on the 1970 Amendments9–was directed to set 
the standards.10 
 With respect to the air quality criteria, Congress required 
for the first time that the criteria describe effects on “public 
health and welfare.”  Previously, it had required that  criteria 
describe effects on the health and welfare “of persons”11 or 
simply on “health and welfare.”12   Yet, while changing the 
language, Congress instructed EPA to base the very first 
NAAQS on HEW’s existing criteria.13  These criteria 
considered only the consequences for health and welfare of 
the presence of pollutants in the ambient air and they 
stressed the  difficulties of drawing a bright line between 
pollution that is harmful and pollution that is not.14  Congress 
in 1970 responded to the challenges of scientific uncertainty 
by further providing that the air quality standards protecting 
human health–the primary standards–must embody “an 
adequate margin of safety.”15  
 During the past thirty years, Congress has enacted 
                                                 
9See Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 5 U.S.C.A. App. (Supp. 1992). 
 
10See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, sec. 
109, § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 1679-80.    
 
11Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 3(c)(2), 77 Stat. 
392, 395. 
 
12Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, sec. 107(b)(1), § 2,  
81 Stat. 485, 491. 
 
13See 42 U.S.C. 7409(a)(1)(A), 7409(b)(1).  
 
14See, e.g., National Air Pollution Control Administration (NAPCA), 
HEW, Guidelines for the Development of Air Quality Standards 
and Implementation Plans 16 (1969). 
 
15Sec. 109(b)(1), § 4(a), 84 Stat. at 1679. 
 
 numerous revisions to the Clean Air Act, most significantly in 
1977 and 1990,16 and Congress has considered and rejected 
many more proposed amendments to the Act.17  The Act 
today “consumes 313 pages of the Statutes at Large, nearly 
ten times the length of the original Clean Air Act of 1970. . . 
“
18
  Yet, in the face of all this ongoing legislative activity, 
Congress has left essentially untouched the fundamental 
“public health” and “welfare” basis long in existence for the 
development of air quality criteria and NAAQS.  Then, as 
now, the NAAQS are to be based on “the kind and extent of 
all identifiable effects on public health and welfare which 
may be expected from the presence of such pollutant in the 
ambient air.” 
 In sharp contrast, Congress has made a host of both 
targeted and sweeping revisions to the Act designed to 
address the extent to which economic costs and economic 
and technological feasibility should be relevant in 
establishing pollution control requirements to implement the 
NAAQS.  For example, Congress added in 1977 and 1990 
the detailed nonattainment provisions designed to provide 
areas not meeting the NAAQS with both more time and more 
guidance in achieving that statutory objective.19 
                                                 
16Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 
685; Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 
Stat. 2399. 
 
17For example, Congress held extensive oversight hearings on the 
Clean Air Act just a few months after the D.C. Circuit in Lead 
Industries Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 1042 (1980), upheld EPA’s view that costs are irrelevant 
to the setting of NAAQS. See Clean Air Act Oversight: Hearings 
before the Sen. Comm. Envt & Pub. Works, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 
pts 1&2 (1981).  Of course, the proper role of costs in setting 
NAAQS arose in those hearings, id. at  85, yet the hearings 
produced no change in the NAAQS provisions. 
 
18Rodgers, Environmental Law, supra, § 3.2, p. 140. 
 
19See 42 U.S.C. 7501-7515. 
 
  Congress has also added a series of provisions allowing 
for specific exemptions and extensions based on economic 
concerns.   For example, both the President of the United 
States and State Governors are allowed, in specified 
circumstances, to suspend statutory requirements based on 
concerns related to unemployment and plant closings.  42 
U.S.C. 7410(f)(2), 7410(g)(1)(B).  Congress has similarly 
provided relief from motor vehicle emissions standards, 
transportation control measures, and emission limitations 
applicable to certain manufacturing facilities.20  
 In sum, Congress has maintained a sharp distinction at 
least since passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970, if not long 
before, between the role of costs in the setting of the air 
quality standards that serve as the Act’s overriding objective 
and the role of costs in developing the means for 
implementing those standards.  Congress concluded early 
on that compliance costs should not be relevant to the 
former and has never disturbed its initial policy judgment.  At 
the same time, Congress concluded that such costs should 
be relevant to the latter and has since repeatedly revisited 
precisely how to take such costs into account, in light of its 
ongoing experience with the Act’s actual operation.  
 
B.  Particulate Matter and Ozone Rulemakings 
 
 In our brief on the merits in Browner v. American Trucking 
Associations, Inc., No. 99-1257, we described EPA’s 
rulemaking proceedings with respect to the PM and ozone 
NAAQS.  MA & NJ Br. 20-24.  That same description is 
equally relevant to the issues in this case.  
  
C.  Proceedings Below 
 
 In rejecting cross-petitioners’ reading of the Clean Air Act, 
                                                 
20See Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, 
Pub. L. No. 93-319, §§ 4-5, 88 Stat. 246, 256-260; Steel Industry 
Compliance Extension Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-23, 95 Stat. 
139. 
 
 the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed its longstanding conclusion that 
the plain meaning of the Act forbids EPA from considering 
costs in  setting the NAAQS.  U.S. Pet. App. 19a.21 
 
 INTRODUCTION AND 
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
  
 The Clean Air Act’s National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS) program is one of the signal success 
stories of American environmental law.  Emissions of most of 
the pollutants regulated by the program have dramatically 
decreased in the thirty years that the program has been in 
place, despite substantial increases in the size of our 
population and in the amount of economic activity.22  In a 
recent peer-reviewed, retrospective study of the Clean Air 
Act’s first twenty years, the EPA concluded that the Act had 
produced almost 22 trillion dollars more in benefits than it 
had imposed in costs, and EPA believed that even this 
dazzling amount probably understated the benefits of the 
statute.23  A widely cited survey of EPA managers conducted 
                                                 
21The court also held that EPA had erred in declining to consider 
evidence that ground-level ozone is beneficial for people because 
it helps to counteract the adverse health effects caused by the 
decline in the ozone layer (itself caused by air pollution).  U.S. Pet. 
App. 44a-49a.  No one has sought review of this ruling. 
 
22See Richard N.L. Andrews, Managing the Environment, 
Managing Ourselves – A History of American Environmental Policy 
280 (Yale Univ. 1999) (“Emissions of particulate matter (smoke) 
dropped by nearly 80 percent from 1970 to 1994, for instance, and 
of lead by 98 percent, even as the U.S. population increased by 27 
percent, its gross domestic product by 90 percent, and its vehicle 
use by 111 percent.  Emissions of carbon monoxide and volatile 
organic compounds each dropped by over 20 percent, and sulfur 
by one-third; only nitrogen oxides increased.”) (citing U.S. Council 
on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality: 25th Annual 
Report–1994-95, 179, 182 (1997). 
 
23EPA, Office of Air and Radiation, The Benefits and Costs of the 
Clean Air Act, 1970 to 1990 at ES-8 (Oct. 1997).  This report 
focused almost exclusively on the consequences of regulating the 
 in the late 1980s concluded that the air pollution addressed 
by the NAAQS program should be ranked first on a list of 
environmental problems ranked according to the risks they 
posed to human health, welfare, and ecosystems.24  
 Cross-petitioners want to disrupt this successful 
regulatory regime.  They ask this Court to hold, contrary to 
thirty years of agency and judicial precedent, that the Clean 
Air Act requires EPA to balance costs against benefits in 
setting the NAAQS.  But in creating the NAAQS program, 
Congress was faced with the questions of whether to allow 
costs to play any role in this program and, if so, what role 
they should play.  Congress ultimately chose to exclude the 
consideration of costs from the process of setting the 
NAAQS but to allow the consideration of costs in the process 
of implementing these standards. 
 1.  The meaning of the Clean Air Act is plain, and has 
been settled for decades: costs may not be considered in 
setting the NAAQS.  Sections 108 and 109 of the Act clearly 
direct EPA, in setting the NAAQS, to consider only the 
effects on public health and welfare of breathing polluted air.  
These provisions instruct EPA to base the NAAQS on air 
quality criteria that themselves discuss only the effects on 
public health and welfare of “the presence of [an air] 
pollutant in the ambient air.”  42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(2).  This 
instruction leaves no room for the consideration of costs.  
Were there any doubt on this point, however, it would be 
dispelled by the numerous provisions of the Act explicitly 
allowing or requiring the Administrator to consider costs in 
implementing the NAAQS; clearly Congress knew how to 
permit the agency to consider costs when Congress wanted 
to.  For cross-petitioners to ask this Court to insert the word 
“costs” into sections 108 and 109 in the face of Congress’s 
clear decision to exclude it is to request a large and 
unwholesome shift in the Court’s approach to interpreting 
                                                                                                    
criteria air pollutants. Id.  
 
24U.S. EPA, Unfinished Business: A Comparative Assessment of 
Environmental Priorities 58 (1987). 
 
 statutes. 
 Given the clarity of the statutory text, this Court should not 
distort the plain meaning of the Clean Air Act in order to 
avoid the constitutional issue of delegation.  The error in 
rewriting a statute simply to avoid a constitutional issue is 
particularly pronounced where, as here, the resolution of the 
constitutional issue is, under this Court’s precedents, 
straightforward and where, if anything, the proffered 
alternative interpretation(s) of the statute would not avoid the 
constitutional issue as cross-petitioners see it. 
 Cross-petitioners’ inability to mount any convincing 
argument based on the language or history of the Clean Air 
Act forces them to ask this Court to adopt a special canon of 
construction tailor-made by them for this case: they ask the 
Court to hold that unless Congress explicitly prohibits the 
consideration of costs in a statute, costs must be 
considered.  This is nothing other than an inappropriate plea 
to have this Court rewrite the Clean Air Act in order to further 
cross-petitioners’ views on social policy. 
 2.  The Clean Air Act is perfectly rational as written and as 
understood for three decades.  Contrary to the excited 
claims of those challenging EPA’s PM and ozone rules, the 
Act does not force this country to abandon industrial activity; 
it does not allow the Administrator privately to consider costs 
and publicly to deny it; and it reflects Congress’s considered 
judgment concerning potential tradeoffs between regulatory 
costs and health.  Finally, by precluding the consideration of 
costs in setting the NAAQS but by allowing such 
consideration in implementing them, the Clean Air Act avoids 
one of the most troublesome features of the cost-benefit 
balancing cross-petitioners endorse: its tendency to 
underestimate the benefits of regulation and to overestimate 
the costs.  This tendency also helps to explain what would 
otherwise be one of the great unsolved mysteries of the 
regulatory state: how a set of standards set without regard to 
cost can, even from the perspective of cost-benefit analysis, 
become one of the great success stories of environmental 
law. 
 
 ARGUMENT 
  
I.  THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
PRECLUDES EPA FROM CONSIDERING COSTS IN 
SETTING THE NAAQS 
 
 Cross-petitioners and their supporting respondents and 
amici offer a dizzying array of possible interpretations of the 
Clean Air Act.25  The proffered interpretations do, however, 
have one thing in common: all of them would import some 
kind of balancing of costs and benefits into the process of 
setting the NAAQS. 
 The plain language of the Clean Air Act admits of only 
one conclusion: the Act precludes EPA from considering 
costs in setting the NAAQS.  “[I]n any case of statutory 
construction, our analysis begins with the language of the 
statute . . . . And where the statutory language provides a 
clear answer, it ends there as well.”  Harris Trust & Savings 
Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2180, 2191 
(2000), quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 
432, 438 (1999) (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  As we explain below, the statutory text alone is 
clear enough to resolve the issue presented here; that text 
precludes the cost-benefit balancing cross-petitioners 
embrace.26 Where Congress has wanted to include some 
                                                 
25Cross-petitioners and respondents and amici in support of cross-
petitioners appear to disagree both over whether EPA is required 
or merely permitted to consider non-health factors in setting the 
NAAQS (compare ATA Br. 32 with, e.g., American Boiler Mfrs. Am 
Br. 4) and over which non-health factors are to be considered 
(compare ATA Br. 30 (cost-benefit balancing might mean 
analyzing standard according to “significant risks or other similar 
rubrics,” or according to the quality-adjusted life-years saved by 
the standard) with Hatch Am. Br. 18 (“feasibility concerns would 
not trump health” under the statute) and with Inhofe Am. Br. 10-12 
(EPA permitted to consider countervailing health risks, risk 
significance, cost and technological feasibility)). 
 
26Lest there remain any doubt, however, we also offer citations to 
the legislative history confirming the conclusion that the Clean Air 
Act precludes the consideration of costs in setting the NAAQS.  
 kind of balancing test in health, safety, and environmental 
legislation, it has done so clearly, carefully, and with due 
attention to the specific circumstances at hand.  In the Clean 
Air Act itself, Congress clearly and carefully balanced, or 
allowed EPA to balance, costs and benefits only when the 
NAAQS are being implemented, not when they are being 
set.  Cross-petitioners’ efforts to force the meaning they 
desire into the language of the statute must fail. 
 
A.  Sections 108 and 109 of the Clean Air Act Clearly 
Direct EPA to Consider Only the Effects of Air Pollution 
on Public Health and Welfare in Setting the NAAQS 
 
 Section 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act provides that the 
primary NAAQS are standards “the attainment and 
maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator, 
based on such criteria and allowing an adequate margin of 
safety, are requisite to protect the public health.”  42 U.S.C. 
7409(b)(1).  Secondary NAAQS are those “requisite to 
protect the public welfare”; they do not similarly allow for a 
margin of safety.  42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(2).  In determining what 
it means to “protect the public health” with an “adequate 
margin of safety” and what it means to “protect the public 
welfare,” it is crucial to consider the kind of evidence 
Congress directed EPA to take into account in setting the 
NAAQS. 
 Congress directed EPA to set the NAAQS “based on” the 
air quality criteria.  42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1)-(2).  In formulating 
the directive in this way in the 1970 amendments, Congress 
eliminated previous language that had required the states, in 
setting their own air quality standards, to set standards 
“consistent with” both “the air quality criteria and 
recommended control techniques” HEW had previously been 
required to issue.27  Clearly, then, in 1970 Congress was 
                                                                                                    
For a fuller account of the evolution of the NAAQS program in 
Congress, see MA & NJ Br., No. 99-1257, at 7-19; Clean Air Trust 
Am. Br., passim. 
 
27Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, sec. 108(c)(1), § 2, 
 instructing EPA to base the NAAQS on air quality criteria 
alone.  The content of the criteria documents is thus critical 
to determining the content of the NAAQS. 
 In section 108(a)(2), Congress supplied the answer to the 
question concerning the proper scope of the criteria 
documents in unambiguous terms.  This section provides 
that the air quality criteria are to “reflect the latest scientific 
knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of all 
identifiable effects on public health or welfare which may be 
expected from the presence of such pollutant in the ambient 
air, in varying quantities.”  42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(2).  Thus: air 
quality criteria are not to be based on economic information; 
the effects of concern are not costs; the effects to be 
discussed are not theoretical effects predicted by abstract 
economic models; and the relevant effects are not those 
arising from regulation itself. 
 This conclusion is further confirmed by section 108(b)(1).  
This provision requires EPA, “[s]imultaneously with the 
issuance of criteria under subsection (a) of this section,” to 
issue information on the costs and feasibility of various 
pollution control technologies.  42 U.S.C. 7408(b)(1) 
(emphasis added).  Section 108(b)(1) thus clearly 
distinguishes the “criteria”–on which NAAQS are to be 
“based,” 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(2)–from information on economic 
costs and technological feasibility. 
 Section 109(a)(1) and 109(b)(1) together also make plain 
that air quality criteria must discuss only the effects of air 
pollution on health and welfare, not the effects of regulation 
on the economic costs of pollution control.  In section 
109(a)(1), Congress directed the Administrator to issue, 
within thirty days of December 31, 1970, primary and 
secondary NAAQS “for each air pollutant for which air quality 
criteria have been issued prior to such date,” 42 U.S.C. 
7409(a)(1), and in section 109(b), Congress provided that 
the new primary and secondary NAAQS were to be “based 
on such criteria.”28  42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1)-(2).  The criteria 
                                                                                                    
81 Stat. 485, 492 (emphasis added). 
 
28For air pollutants for which criteria were issued after December 
 that had been issued prior to the stated date were those 
issued by the Secretary of HEW under the prior version of 
the Clean Air Act.  In directing EPA to set the new NAAQS 
based on HEW’s criteria documents, Congress explicitly 
endorsed the documents HEW had so far compiled. 
 The HEW criteria documents that Congress endorsed 
confirm the exclusive relevance of scientific evidence of 
human health effects and the irrelevance of economic 
effects.  HEW opened its 1969 criteria document on 
particulate matter with the following description of air quality 
criteria: 
Air quality criteria are an expression of the scientific 
knowledge of the relationship between various 
concentrations of air pollutants in the air and their adverse 
effects on man and his environment. . . . Air quality criteria 
are descriptive; that is, they describe the effects that have 
been observed to occur when the ambient air level of a 
pollutant has reached or exceeded specific figures for a 
specific time period.29 
In keeping with this understanding of the role of air quality 
criteria, HEW’s criteria discussed scientific research from 
epidemiological, clinical, toxicological,  and meteorological 
investigations.30  They  discussed effects on human health, 
                                                                                                    
31, 1970, EPA was directed to issue NAAQS simultaneously with 
those criteria and, again, the NAAQS for such pollutants were to 
be “based on such criteria.”  42 U.S.C. 7409(a)(1), 7409(b)(1). 
 
29See NAPCA, HEW, Pub. No. AP-49, Air Quality Criteria for PM 
1-1 (1969) (1969 PM Criteria Doc.); NAPCA, HEW, Pub. No. AP-
62, Air Quality Criteria for Carbon Monoxide 1-1 (1970) (1970 CO 
Criteria Doc.); NAPCA, HEW, Pub. No. AP-64, Air Quality Criteria 
for Hydrocarbons 1-1 (1970) (1970 HC Criteria Doc.); NAPCA, 
HEW, Pub. No. AP-63, Air Quality Criteria for Photochemical 
Oxidants 1-1 (1970) (1970 Ozone Criteria Doc.); NAPCA, HEW, 
Pub. No. AP-50, Air Quality Criteria for Sulfur Oxides 1-1 (1969) 
(1969 SOx Criteria Doc.); see also  Pub. Health Service, HEW, 
Pub. No. 1619, Air Quality Criteria for Sulfur Oxides iv (1967) 
(1967 SOx Criteria Doc.). 
 
30See, e.g., 1967 Sox Criteria Doc., supra. 
 including the initiation and aggravation of respiratory 
diseases including asthma,31 impairment of the oxygen-
carrying capacity of the blood,32 and premature death,33 and 
they discussed these effects only insofar as they were tied to 
air pollution.34  HEW’s criteria documents did not discuss 
compliance costs, and they did not discuss effects that arose 
from regulation itself rather than from air pollution.  
Congress’s endorsement of HEW’s basic approach in the 
criteria documents compiled as of 1970 thus shows what the 
criteria on which the NAAQS are to be based should include 
(scientific research into the health effects of pollution) and 
what they should not include (economic research into the 
economic consequences of regulation).35 
 The explicit directive to EPA to base the first NAAQS on 
HEW’s criteria documents also helps to explain the meaning 
of the “adequate margin of safety” that Congress required for 
the NAAQS.  42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1).  The concept of a margin 
of safety as embraced in the Clean Air Act was an outgrowth 
of HEW’s experience in developing the first criteria 
documents.  HEW’s review of the scientific literature on the 
criteria pollutants had revealed a diverse array of harms 
                                                                                                    
 
31See 1970 Ozone Criteria Doc., supra, at 10-7. 
 
32See 1970 CO Criteria Doc., supra, at 10-3. 
 
33See 1967 SOx Criteria Doc., supra, at xxix. 
 
34See 1967 SOx Criteria Doc., supra, at liii (graphical depiction of 
results of studies concerning health and welfare effects of sulfur 
oxides); 1969 PM Criteria Doc., supra, at 188-89 (summary of 
health effects at various exposure levels); 1970 CO Criteria Doc., 
supra, at 10-7 (table reflecting health effects at various exposure 
levels); 1970 Ozone Criteria Doc., supra, at 10-9 to 10-13 (text and 
table detailing health and welfare effects associated with different 
levels of exposure). 
 
35Because of the importance of the issues settled therein, copies of 
all the relevant HEW criteria documents that predate passage of 
the 1970 Act have been lodged with the Court. 
 
 which occurred at a diverse array of pollution levels.36 HEW 
also was convinced that the lowest level at which an air 
pollutant was shown in scientific research to have caused an 
adverse public health effect was not necessarily the lowest 
level at which that pollutant in fact caused such an effect.37  
HEW thus recommended that margins of safety be 
incorporated in then-existing state air quality standards in 
order to remedy the problem of under-protection that might 
otherwise follow from the limits of scientific proof.38  
Congress accepted this recommendation when it required in 
1970 that the federal government set ambient air quality 
standards that allowed “an adequate margin of safety.”39  
                                                 
36See sources cited supra, n. 34. 
 
37In its 1969 guidelines on developing air quality criteria, HEW 
explained: 
37The exposure levels which have thus far been associated with 
identifiable effects . . . are not necessarily the lowest levels of 
exposure that will produce such effects.  Nor are those effects 
necessarily the only ones produced by such exposures.  
Knowledge of the synergistic effects of air pollutants is limited.  So 
is knowledge of possible long-term genetic effects. . . . In short, air 
quality criteria cannot be interpreted as threshold values; indeed, 
for many types of air pollutants, there may not be a threshold of 
risk to health and the environment.  In the evaluation of biological 
effects of environmental contaminants, whether in the community 
or occupational environment, accumulating evidence has almost 
invariably shown that adverse effects can and do occur at 
exposure levels that at one time were considered “safe.” 
NAPCA, HEW, Guidelines for the Development of Air Quality 
Standards and Implementation Plans, supra, at 16. 
 
381969 PM Criteria Doc., supra, at 189; see also 1970 Ozone 
Criteria Doc., supra, at 10-13; 1970 CO Criteria Doc., supra, at 10-
6. 
 
39The Senate report on the legislation explained that “margins of 
safety are essential to any health-related environmental standards 
if a reasonable degree of protection is to be provided against 
hazards which research has not yet identified.”  S. Rep. No. 91-
1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 10 (1970). 
 The requirement that EPA allow an adequate margin of 
safety in the NAAQS thus signals a congressional embrace 
of a particular approach towards the scientific uncertainty 
that inevitably attends estimates of the effects of air 
pollution, an approach that leans in the direction of stricter 
rather than more lenient standards where (as they always 
are) the facts are uncertain. 
 Congress’s embrace of HEW’s original criteria also helps 
to explain the meaning of the “public health” to be discussed 
in the criteria and protected by the NAAQS.  Although 
Congress in the 1970 Clean Air Amendments shifted from 
requiring that criteria describe effects on “health and 
welfare”40 to requiring that they describe effects on “public 
health and welfare,” Congress’s simultaneous endorsement 
of the criteria documents already compiled demonstrates 
Congress’s belief that those documents adequately reflected 
the kinds of human health effects Congress thought relevant 
to setting the NAAQS.  In other words, the insertion of the 
word “public” before the word “health” did not fundamentally 
change the nature of the inquiry to be conducted in 
developing the criteria documents; specifically, it did not 
change that inquiry from a scientific investigation of the 
health and welfare effects of pollution into an investigation of 
the economic costs of regulation.  Instead, by targeting 
public health, Congress simply instructed EPA to target 
health effects in populations rather than in single individuals. 
 The language of the Clean Air Act also clearly instructs 
EPA to consider only the effects on human health and 
welfare that are caused by air pollution, not those that might 
be caused by regulation itself.  In describing the criteria on 
which the NAAQS are to be based, section 108(a)(2) makes 
this point plain by instructing EPA to consider only the 
effects on health and welfare “which may be expected from 
the presence of [an air] pollutant in the ambient air, in 
varying quantities.”  42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(2).  This is a clear 
                                                                                                    
 
40Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, sec. 107(b)(1), § 2, 
81 Stat. 485, 491. 
 
 directive to EPA to focus on the effects of air pollution, not 
the effects of regulation. 
 Elsewhere in the Act, Congress demonstrated that it knew 
how to tell EPA to look at health and welfare effects arising 
from causes other than air pollution.  Indeed, in the Clean Air 
Act, Congress invented a new (albeit clunky) phrase–“nonair 
quality impacts”–to refer to such effects.  See, e.g., 42 
U.S.C. 7411(a)(1) (defining “standard of performance” for 
new stationary sources to include consideration of, among 
other things, “any nonair quality health and environmental 
impact”); 42 U.S.C. 7509(d)(2) (requiring states that have not 
attained NAAQS by applicable deadlines to revise SIPs to 
include measures prescribed by Administrator, including 
measures feasible “in light of technological achievability, 
costs, and any nonair quality and other air quality-related 
health and environmental impacts”); 42 U.S.C. 7545(k)(1) 
(directing Administrator, in establishing requirements for 
reformulated gasoline, to take into account “the cost of 
achieving such emission reductions, any nonair-quality and 
other air-quality related health and environmental impacts 
and energy requirements”).  No such reference to “nonair 
quality” impacts appears anywhere in the statutory 
provisions relevant to the setting of the NAAQS.   Here too, 
moreover, Congress’s endorsement of HEW’s original 
criteria documents is revealing: HEW did not discuss the 
effects of regulation on human health and welfare, it 
discussed the effects of air pollution on human health and 
welfare. 
 Consistent with the lessons learned from HEW’s 
experience in developing the original criteria documents, 
Congress expressly acknowledged the necessity of 
deference to the Administrator’s “judgment” in promulgating 
any NAAQS based on such criteria. 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1-2).  
HEW’s criteria documents testified to the high degree of 
scientific uncertainty unavoidably surrounding both the 
assessment of public health effects at varying levels of air 
pollution and the related task of selecting a level requisite to 
protect public health.  Congress provided procedural and 
substantive guidance for those administrative actions, yet 
recognized the Administrator’s decisions would ultimately 
 require “judgment.” 
 In directing EPA to set standards to protect the public 
health and welfare, Congress nowhere added a qualifier 
based on economics or feasibility.  Cross-petitioners no 
doubt wish that the statute were written differently; they no 
doubt wish that the statute provided, for example, that 
NAAQS are standards requisite to protect the public health 
“in light of economic costs, technological feasibility, or any 
other factor.”  But the statute is not so written and the words 
that Congress in fact used leave no room for cross-
petitioners’ preferred policy outcome.  The Court should, 
accordingly, decline cross-petitioners’ invitation to add to the 
factors Congress itself has identified as relevant to the 
process of setting the NAAQS.  See, e.g., Union Electric Co. 
v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976) (refusing to require 
Administrator, in reviewing adequacy of SIPs, to consider 
factors (cost and feasibility) not specified by section 
110(a)(2) of Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7410(a)(2)). This is 
especially so where, as here, Congress clearly paid close 
attention to the issue of economic costs and specified that 
this factor would play an important role, not in the setting of 
the NAAQS, but in their implementation.   
 
B. Congress’s Explicit Recognition of the Relevance of 
Costs to the Implementation of the NAAQS Confirms the 
Irrelevance of Costs to Setting the NAAQS 
 
 The NAAQS themselves do not regulate any source of 
pollution.  Instead, they set the health-based benchmark that 
the regulation of sources of pollution is to achieve.  Pollution 
sources are regulated under the Act both by the states and 
by the federal government.  In both state and federal 
regulation of pollution sources, costs and feasibility play a 
significant role.  Moreover, in cases in which efforts to 
achieve the NAAQS cause significant economic hardship, 
Congress has provided several specific, targeted escape 
valves allowing departures from the requirements of the Act. 
 These features of the Act, discussed in detail below, lead 
to two important conclusions.  First, because so many 
provisions of the Clean Air Act explicitly require or allow EPA 
 to take costs into account in setting standards under the Act, 
Congress’s failure to explicitly allow EPA to consider costs in 
setting the NAAQS should be taken as decisive evidence 
that it meant to preclude such consideration in that process.  
“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one 
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the 
same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.”  GMC v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 537-38 
(1990) (unanimously declining to insert deadline into section 
110(a)(3)(A) of Clean Air Act, noting Congress’s 
establishment of explicit deadlines elsewhere in Act), quoting 
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983), quoting 
United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 
1972).  Second, to import the consideration of costs into the 
process of setting the NAAQS would upset Congress’s 
carefully constructed, and carefully limited, scheme for 
allowing such economic costs to affect the quality of the 
ambient air. 
 The states are the entities primarily responsible for 
implementing the NAAQS.  The states’ basic obligation 
under the Act is to ensure attainment and maintenance of 
the NAAQS by the relevant deadline; “[s]o long as the 
national standards are met, the State may select whatever 
mix of control devices it desires . . .” Union Electric 
Company, 427 U.S. at 266; see also Train v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975).  The 
states’ deadlines, however, may be extended by the 
Administrator based in part on the “availability and feasibility 
of pollution control measures.”  42 U.S.C. 7502(a)(2)(A).  In 
numerous ways, moreover, states themselves are 
encouraged to choose the most cost-effective or least 
economically disruptive means of achieving the NAAQS.  42 
U.S.C. 7410(a)(2)(A) (including “economic incentives such 
as fees, marketable permits, and auctions of emissions 
rights” in the list of control measures states may include in 
their SIPs); 7410(a)(2)(H) (requiring states  to provide for 
revision of their SIPs “as may be necessary to take account 
of . . . the availability of improved or more expeditious 
methods of attaining” the NAAQS); 42 U.S.C. 7410(a)(3)(B) 
 (in aftermath of energy crisis of early 1970s, requiring states 
to determine whether they could revise their SIPs in relation 
to fuel burning stationary sources without interfering with 
NAAQS compliance).   
 In limited circumstances, states may temporarily avoid 
some of their obligations under the statute in order to 
prevent significant economic disruption and unemployment.  
For example, a Governor may petition the President “to 
determine that a national or regional energy emergency 
exists of such severity” that sanctions for excess emissions 
of sulfur dioxide or nitrogen oxides should be temporarily 
suspended.  42 U.S.C. 7410(f).  Such a suspension may be 
issued only upon a finding of “high levels of unemployment 
or loss of necessary energy supplies for residential 
dwellings” within the vicinity of an affected source.  42 
U.S.C. 7410(f)(2).  In addition, if a state has submitted a 
revision to a SIP which has been pending before the 
Administrator for a year or more, the Governor of that state 
may temporarily suspend the provisions of the SIP she 
seeks to revise, if the revised SIP meets the requirements of 
the Act and “is necessary (i) to prevent the closing for one 
year or more of any source of air pollution, and (ii) to prevent 
substantial increases in unemployment which would result 
from such closing.”  42 U.S.C. 7410(g)(1).  In a similar vein, 
a Governor may, in cooperation with the President, require 
the use of locally or regionally available coal or coal 
derivatives in order to avoid “significant local or regional 
economic disruption or unemployment.” 42 U.S.C. 7425(a)-
(b). 
 The federal government also plays a substantial role in 
efforts to achieve the NAAQS.  EPA sets emissions 
standards for cars and trucks, major new stationary sources 
of pollution, and other pollution sources.  Although these 
requirements need not pertain exclusively to the pollutants 
regulated under the NAAQS program, in practice, those 
pollutants have been their focus.  Congress has allowed or 
required EPA to consider costs in every one of these 
standard-setting contexts.  See 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(3)(A)(i) (in 
setting standards for mobile sources, Administrator is 
directed to give “appropriate consideration” to “cost, energy, 
 and safety factors”); 42 U.S.C. 7545(c)(2)(B) (Administrator 
may not regulate fuel additive on account of its harm to 
vehicle emission control systems unless it first does “cost 
benefit analysis” of such regulation); 42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(1), 
(b)(1) (for certain categories of new sources, Administrator 
must set “standards of performance” which take into account 
“costs and nonair quality health and environmental impacts 
and energy requirements”); 42 U.S.C. 7547(a)(3) (in setting 
deadlines for compliance with emissions standards for 
nonroad vehicles, Administrator is directed to give 
“appropriate consideration” to cost); 42 U.S.C. 7571(b) (in 
setting deadlines for compliance with emissions standards 
for aircraft, Administrator is directed to give “appropriate 
consideration” to cost). 
 Thus both the states and EPA enjoy extensive authority to 
consider costs in their efforts to achieve air quality meeting 
the NAAQS.  To be sure, neither the states nor EPA has the 
authority to revise the NAAQS themselves based on costs, 
or to extend the deadlines for meeting the NAAQS beyond 
the deadlines and extensions provided in the statute.  Only 
Congress has this authority.  A brief review of the history of 
the NAAQS program in Congress shows that Congress has 
not hesitated to soften the requirements of the Clean Air Act 
where it has found this necessary to avoid significant 
economic disruption.  Tellingly, however, Congress has 
never chosen to avoid such disruption by tinkering with the 
NAAQS themselves.  Hence, in Congress as well as in the 
states and at EPA, costs find their expression in the 
implementation rather than in the setting of the NAAQS. 
 On numerous occasions, Congress has revised the 
deadlines and implementation strategies required by the Act.  
See, e.g., Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination 
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319,  § 5(a)-(b), 88 Stat. 246, 
258 (extending deadlines for motor vehicle emissions 
standards); id. § 4, 88 Stat. at 256-58 (restricting EPA’s 
authority to impose transportation control measures in 
federal implementation plans and requiring a study of the 
economic impact of certain transportation control measures); 
Steel Industry Compliance Extension Act of 1981, Pub. L. 
No. 97-23, 95 Stat. 139 (allowing, for certain iron- and steel-
 producing operations, extension of deadline for compliance 
with emission limitations).   
 In addition, the extraordinarily detailed nonattainment 
provisions Congress added to the Act in 1977 and 1990 
reflect just such a consideration of economic costs and 
feasibility.  Congress declined to require immediate strict 
adherence to deadlines for NAAQS compliance that had 
since passed. In 1977, for example, Congress instead 
developed a program that allowed for states to develop 
nonattainment plans that achieved “reasonable further 
progress” toward attaining NAAQS.  See 42 U.S.C. 7501-
7509a.  And in 1990, Congress substantially extended (by as 
much as twenty years) the deadlines for areas that had not 
yet attained the NAAQS in effect at that time.  See, e.g., 42 
U.S.C. 7511(a)(1). 
 In adjusting the deadlines and implementation strategies 
for meeting the NAAQS, Congress itself has balanced the 
public health and welfare goals of the statute against the 
economic and technological challenges posed by meeting 
those goals.  Cf.  American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 
452 U.S. 490, 509 (1981).  Congress has concluded that to 
the extent any such balancing is relevant, its goals are best 
met by confining the consideration of costs and feasibility to 
implementation of the NAAQS rather than by basing the 
setting of the NAAQS on such factors in the first instance. 
 
C. The Textual Arguments of Cross-Petitioners and Their 
Supporting Respondents and Amici Are Without Merit 
 
 Cross-petitioners and their supporting respondents and 
amici attempt to smuggle the consideration of costs into the 
process of setting the NAAQS through several arguments 
based on the language of the Act.  These arguments are 
exceedingly weak.  Indeed, insofar as cross-petitioners and 
their supporters simply ignore statutory language contrary to 
their central claim, their arguments border on the wholly 
frivolous.  
 “Public Health.”  Cross-petitioners and their supporting 
respondents and amici argue that the term “public health” 
imports consideration of compliance costs into the NAAQS-
 setting process.  This argument is wrong for many reasons.  
 First, as already discussed, in the 1970 amendments to 
the Clean Air Act, Congress expressly embraced HEW’s 
approach to describing impacts on public health by requiring 
that EPA’s new NAAQS be based on the criteria documents 
HEW had already compiled.  42 U.S.C. 7409(a)(1)(A), 
7409(b)(1).  HEW’s approach did not look at the economics 
of regulation.  Instead, it looked at the health effects of air 
pollution on the human population.  Cross-petitioners’ 
interpretation of the words “public health” is inconsistent with 
Congress’s endorsement of HEW’s criteria documents. 
 Moreover, cross-petitioners’ interpretation would create 
an awkward situation in which costs would be relevant to 
setting the primary NAAQS, but not to setting the secondary 
NAAQS.  Only the primary NAAQS are set according to the 
requirements of “public health,” which, cross-petitioners 
argue, are determined by looking at costs.  42 U.S.C. 
7409(b)(1).  Thus, under cross-petitioners’ interpretation of 
the term “public health,” EPA is obliged to be cost-conscious 
in protecting human health, but is not so obliged when 
protecting the environment through the secondary NAAQS.  
This interpretation is in considerable tension with Congress’s 
predominant focus on the health effects of air pollution.41 
 Furthermore, cross-petitioners’ argument is inconsistent 
with the text of numerous provisions of the Act.  Many 
provisions of the Act explicitly allow or require EPA to 
consider both economic costs and “public health” in setting 
regulatory standards under the Act.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 
7502(a)(1), 7502(a)(3)(A)(i) (motor vehicles); 42 U.S.C. 
7411(a)(1), 7411(b)(1) (new source performance standards); 
42 U.S.C. 7547(a)(1), 7547(a)(3) (nonroad vehicles); 42 
U.S.C. 7571(a)(2)(A), 7571(b) (aircraft emissions).  See also 
42 U.S.C. 7612(a) (requiring economic impact analysis 
describing effects of Clean Air Act standards on the “public 
health” and “economy”).  If “public health” includes “costs,” 
                                                 
41Cross-petitioners also argue that the term “welfare” incorporates 
consideration of costs, but this argument simply ignores critical 
language in the definition of welfare.  See infra at 31. 
 
 as cross-petitioners argue, Congress could have rested, in 
every one of the cited sections, with a simple directive to 
EPA to consider effects on public health.  To paraphrase this 
Court’s decision last Term in Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 
120 S.Ct. 1815, 1826 (2000), why would Congress add the 
words “costs” if (as cross-petitioners’ argument implies) they 
add nothing?42 
 “Welfare.”  Next, cross-petitioners argue that EPA must 
consider costs in setting the NAAQS because section 
108(a)(2)(C) directs EPA to describe, in its criteria 
documents, “any known or anticipated adverse effects on 
welfare.”  42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(2)(C).  Because, they reason, 
the definition of “welfare” includes “effects on economic 
values,” the criteria documents must describe the 
compliance costs of regulation.  ATA Br. 37-39. 
 Even if cross-petitioners’ interpretation of the word 
“welfare” were correct (which, as we explain below, it is not), 
their argument would be irrelevant to EPA’s decision to 
revise the primary NAAQS for PM and ozone.  Cross-
petitioners’ erroneous reading of the definition of “welfare” in 
section 302(h) cannot change the language of section 
109(b)(1), which requires primary NAAQS to protect the 
public health.  42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1).  The criteria documents’ 
discussion of effects on welfare is not relevant to setting the 
primary NAAQS; surely cross-petitioners are not arguing that 
effects on wildlife, for example, should be considered in 
setting the primary NAAQS, and yet effects on wildlife are 
also included in the definition of “welfare.”  Cross-petitioners’ 
arguments based on the definition of welfare are irrelevant to 
the primary NAAQS. 
 In setting the secondary NAAQS for an air pollutant, EPA 
is explicitly instructed to consider only the effects on welfare 
“associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the 
                                                 
42See also Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, 523 U.S. 382, 388 (1998) (declining to accept 
interpretation of statute that led to redundancy); United States v. 
Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992) (“a statute must, if 
possible, be construed in such fashion that every word has some 
operative effect”). 
 
 ambient air.”  42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(2) (emphasis added).  
Thus, even where secondary NAAQS are concerned, the 
Clean Air Act makes clear that the only welfare effects that 
are relevant are those arising from air pollution, not those 
arising from regulation. 
 In any event, cross-petitioners’ argument that “welfare” 
encompasses general economic effects is mistaken.  Cross-
petitioners can offer this argument only by ignoring critical 
language in section 302(h)’s definition of “welfare.”  Section 
302(h) provides in full: 
All language referring to effects on welfare includes, but is 
not limited to, effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, 
manmade materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, 
and climate, damage to and deterioration of property, and 
hazards to transportation, as well as effects on economic 
values and on personal comfort and well-being, whether 
caused by transformation, conversion, or combination 
with other air pollutants. 
42 U.S.C. 7602(h) (emphasis added).43  The last, italicized 
clause of this definition makes clear that the effects on 
“welfare” with which Congress was concerned were only the 
effects from air pollution.  Cross-petitioners can argue that 
“welfare” includes the compliance costs of regulation itself 
only by ignoring the critical last clause of this definition; 
indeed, they omit this portion of the definition from their brief 
entirely without any notation, such as an ellipsis, indicating 
that they have done so.  ATA Br. 37-38; see also GE Am. Br. 
16.44 
                                                 
43The italicized clause was added in 1990, § 109(b), 104 Stat. 
2470, to “make[] clear that welfare effects extend to consequences 
of air pollutant emissions that may occur after the pollutant has 
been chemically altered following its release, and to effects caused 
by the combined impacts of air pollutants.”  H.R. Rep. No. 101-
490, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. 274 (1990) (emphasis added). 
 
44Cross-petitioners’ interpretation of the words “welfare” and 
“public health” also would render unnecessary section 108(b)(1)’s 
directive to EPA to furnish information on pollution control costs.  
42 U.S.C. 7408(b)(1).  If information on costs were a requisite part 
of the criteria documents, as cross-petitioners argue, then there 
  “Appropriate.” Respondents in support of cross-petitioners 
argue that cost-benefit analysis is imported into the NAAQS-
setting process via the word “appropriate” in section 
109(d)(1).  App. Pwr. Br. 39-40.  Again, however, reading the 
entire statutory provision at issue serves to defeat 
respondents’ argument.  Section 109(d)(1) provides in 
pertinent part: 
Not later than December 31, 1980, and at five-year 
intervals thereafter, the Administrator shall complete a 
thorough review of the criteria published under section 
7408 of this title and the national ambient air quality 
standards promulgated under this section and shall make 
such revisions in such criteria and standards and 
promulgate such new standards as may be appropriate in 
accordance with section 7408 of this title and subsection 
(b) of this section. 
42 U.S.C. 7409(d)(1) (emphasis added).  Thus 
“appropriateness” is defined by the requirements of sections 
108 and 109(b), which, we have established,  do not require 
or allow cost-benefit balancing. 
 Furthermore, the word “appropriate” appears only in 
reference to the revision of an existing NAAQS or the post-
1980 establishment of a new NAAQS, not in reference to the 
setting of the first NAAQS in the 1970s.  According to 
respondents’ view that the word “appropriate” has a separate 
office from the Act’s other language, then, the initial NAAQS 
set in the 1970s must have been governed by a different 
standard than revisions to the NAAQS.  Section 109(b)(1) 
explicitly rules out such a possibility; it provides that primary 
NAAQS “may be revised in the same manner as 
promulgated.”  42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1). 
 “Adequate margin of safety.”  Respondents supporting 
cross-petitioners argue that Congress must have meant, in 
requiring a margin of safety, to require EPA to consider 
costs.  App. Pwr. Br. 36.  However, as explained above, 
supra at 20-21, Congress required a margin of safety in 
                                                                                                    
would have been no need for a separate requirement that EPA 
develop information on the costs of pollution control. 
 
 1970 in response to HEW’s conviction that the lowest levels 
at which scientific research had shown adverse effects were 
probably not the lowest levels at which such effects 
occurred.  In its early criteria documents–on which Congress 
required EPA to base the first NAAQS (42 U.S.C. 
7409(a)(1), 7408(b))–HEW had thus recommended a 
“margin of safety” designed to protect subpopulations more 
vulnerable to the effects of air pollution than the general 
population.45 The requirement of a margin of safety was thus 
a response to scientific uncertainty, not a way to sneak 
economic consequences into the setting of the NAAQS.46 
 “Judgment.”  Several amici argue that the word 
“judgment” in section 109(b)(1) requires EPA to consider 
costs.  GE Am. Br. 13; Hatch Am. Br. 9-10.  As we set forth 
above, however, supra at 23, this term signals only 
Congress’s candid recognition of the uncertainties attending 
decisions about the quality of air requisite to protect the 
public health.  The term cannot fairly be read, 
notwithstanding amici’s claim, to allow the Administrator to 
consider any factor that  she might in her own “judgment” 
deem relevant.  Indeed, that is precisely the kind of fanciful 
statutory interpretation that, unlike the reading we support, 
could theoretically raise a nondelegation issue.  
 Public comments.  Remarkably, cross-petitioners also 
argue that the fact that EPA must respond to the public’s 
“written comments, data, or documentary information,” 42 
U.S.C. 7607(d)(3), means that these comments, data, and 
information will be “part of the Administrator’s 
decisionmaking data set.”  ATA Br. 40.  That is to say, 
apparently, the Administrator must consider anything 
                                                 
45See, e.g., 1970 Ozone Criteria Doc., supra, at 10-13. 
 
46The concept of a margin of safety has a long history in 
toxicology.  Toxicologists have long recommended that acceptable 
daily intakes of toxic substances be determined by dividing by 100 
the level at which no adverse human health effects have been 
found to occur, in order to account for variations in the sensitivity of 
the human population.  See National Research Council, Science 
and Judgment in Risk Assessment 29-31 (1994). 
 
 submitted in the public record as relevant to her decision 
setting the NAAQS.  Such a process would allow public 
commenters to determine the scope and content of EPA’s 
obligations in setting the NAAQS.  The proposition is 
fantastical. 
 Information to States on Control Technologies.  Cross-
petitioners also assert that costs must be considered in 
setting the NAAQS because Congress directed EPA to 
provide information on the costs and feasibility of control 
technologies in issuing new air quality criteria pursuant to 
section 108(a).  ATA Br. 40.  This argument, too, is 
misguided for several reasons. 
 As explained above, supra at 17, when Congress 
amended the Clean Air Act in 1970, it eliminated language 
that had previously required air quality standards to be 
consistent with both air quality criteria and the information on 
control techniques HEW had been required to provide.47  
Moreover, the Act itself distinguishes the “criteria” on which 
NAAQS are to be based from the information on control 
techniques required by section 108(b)(1).  42 U.S.C. 
7408(b)(1).  Cross-petitioners would undo these careful 
legislative determinations by contending that the information 
on control techniques must  influence the setting of the 
NAAQS.48 
                                                 
47Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, sec. 108(c)(1), 81 
Stat. 485, 492. 
 
48Cross-petitioners’ claim that this Court should import cost 
considerations into section 109(b) because the statute does not 
say that the NAAQS should be based “solely” on the criteria (ATA 
Br. 39) likewise ignores the full language of the statute clearly 
distinguishing criteria from information on costs, 42 U.S.C. 
7408(b)(1); ignores Congress’s deliberate decision in 1970 to 
uncouple the choice of standards from information on costs and 
feasibility, see Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, sec. 
108(c)(1), § 2, 81 Stat. 485, 492; and ignores Congress’s ability, 
demonstrated elsewhere in the Act, to direct EPA to consider costs 
when it wanted the agency to do so.  Congress need not have 
added the extra word “solely” to add an extra dollop of clarity to an 
already plain statutory scheme.  Cross-petitioners’ contrary 
  The information on control techniques required by section 
108(b)(1) was clearly designed not to affect the NAAQS-
setting process, but instead to give the states a running start 
on developing plans to implement the NAAQS.  In requiring 
that this information be provided to “states and appropriate 
air pollution control agencies,” Congress clearly 
contemplated that this information would be used by such 
entities in implementing the NAAQS in timely fashion.  42 
U.S.C. 7408(b)(1).49  Indeed, the state respondents 
supporting cross-petitioners recognized this point in the court 
below.  They argued that EPA had erred in failing to provide 
the information required by section 108(b) with respect to the 
rules at issue here, complaining that EPA had “side-stepped 
its responsibility under §108 to assist the States by 
developing fundamental information, thus making it much 
more difficult for the States to develop and implement 
adequate control strategies.”  State Petitioners’ Final Merit 
Br., at 9, American Trucking Assns. v. Browner, No. 97-1440 
(D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 CASAC advice.  Cross-petitioners also maintain that 
section 109(d)(2)(C)(iv) imports cost considerations into the 
NAAQS-setting process.  ATA Br. 41.  This is plainly wrong.  
Section 109(d)(2)(C)(iv) requires CASAC to 
                                                                                                    
suggestion is merely a variant of their misguided request for a new 
canon of statutory construction, discussed infra at 39-41. 
 
49The Senate Report on the 1970 Amendments explained: 
“Reports on control techniques, as under existing law, would be 
issued simultaneously with the publication of criteria.  The 
Committee recognizes that the States will continue to need this 
information to develop meaningful programs for implementation of 
ambient air quality standards on a regional basis.”  S. Rep. No. 91-
1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 9 (1970).  Cross-petitioners can see 
no purpose in EPA’s development of information on control costs 
and technologies, other than to inform the NAAQS-setting process, 
because they are apparently unable to believe that Congress 
would want to give the states plenty of time to contemplate their 
possible regulatory responses to changes in the NAAQS.  ATA Br. 
40 (referring to “inexplicably premature” mandate of section 
108(b)(1)).   
 
 advise the Administrator of any adverse public health, 
welfare, social, economic, or energy effects which may 
result from various strategies for attainment and 
maintenance of such national ambient air quality 
standards. 
42 U.S.C. 7409(d)(2)(C)(iv) (emphasis added).  Cross-
petitioners, once again, simply ignore critical language in the 
statutory text as well as the basic distinction Congress drew 
between the setting and the implementing of NAAQS, in 
which Congress allowed for consideration of costs only with 
regard to the latter.  Section 109(d)(2)(c)(iv) explicitly 
requires CASAC to report only on the broad implications of 
“strategies for” attainment and maintenance of the NAAQS, 
not on the implications of the NAAQS themselves.  
Moreover, CASAC’s charge to recommend new or revised 
NAAQS is explicitly tied to the standard-setting requirements 
of section 108 and 109(b), 42 U.S.C. 7409(d)(2)(B); nothing 
in section 109(d)(2)(c)(iv) purports to change those 
requirements. 
 “Productive capacity.”  Respondents in support of cross-
petitioners also make the far-fetched claim that cost-benefit 
analysis is required by the Clean Air Act because the 
preamble to the Act identifies as one of the purposes of the 
statute the promotion of “the public health and welfare and 
the productive capacity of [the nation’s] population.”  App. 
Pwr. Br. 29, quoting 42 U.S.C 7401(b)(1).  This preamble 
language, which has been unchanged since the 1963 Clean 
Air Act,50 does not even remotely support respondents’ 
reading of it.  The preamble makes clear that the 
population’s health, welfare, and productive capacity are to 
be “promote[d]” by “protect[ing] and enhanc[ing] the quality 
of the Nation’s air resources”–not by refusing to regulate in 
the face of demonstrable health risks.  42 U.S.C. 7401(b)(1). 
 
D.  Neither the Nondelegation Doctrine Nor Cross-
Petitioners’ Proposed Cost-Benefit Canon Can Override 
                                                 
50See Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 1(b)(1), 77 Stat. 
392, 393. 
 
 the Plain Meaning of the Statutory Language 
 
 No doubt insecure about their arguments based on the 
statutory text, cross-petitioners seek refuge in canons of 
statutory construction.  The first canon cross-petitioners 
invoke is that of avoiding constitutional invalidation where a 
constitutional interpretation of a statute is available.  The 
second is a new canon proposed by cross-petitioners which 
would inject a cost-benefit test into any environmental 
statute that did not use certain magic words in precluding 
such a test.  Neither canon should be used to defeat the 
plain meaning of the Clean Air Act. 
 
1.  Because There Is No “Grave Constitutional Doubt” 
About the Clean Air Act, The Court Should Decline 
Cross-Petitioners’ Invitation to Use the Nondelegation 
Doctrine as an Excuse to Rewrite the Statute 
 
 As we discussed in detail in our opening brief in Browner 
v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., No. 99-1257, the 
Clean Air Act, and EPA’s interpretation of the Act, are plainly 
constitutional under this Court’s precedents on delegation.  
MA & NJ Br. 28-43.  Moreover, as set forth above, cross-
petitioners’ proffered interpretation of the Act is inconsistent 
with the plain meaning of the Act.  Thus, by asking this Court 
to adopt their interpretation of the Act in order to avoid 
deciding the constitutional issue reached by the court below, 
cross-petitioners are inviting this Court to rewrite a statute in 
order to avoid deciding a straightforward and well-settled 
constitutional issue.  The Court should decline to do so. 
 Just last Term, this Court affirmed “the guiding principle 
that ‘where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by 
one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions 
arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, 
our duty is to adopt the latter.’” Jones v. United States, 120 
S.Ct. 1904, 1911 (2000), quoting United States ex rel. 
Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 
408 (1909).  Cross-petitioners’ arguments fail each of the 
three requirements of the principle stated in Jones: as we 
established above, the Clean Air Act is not susceptible of 
 two constructions; as we set forth in detail in our opening 
brief in Browner v. American Trucking Associations, 
precluding costs in the setting of the NAAQS does not raise 
“grave and doubtful constitutional questions”; and, finally, as 
discussed below, cross-petitioners’ proffered 
interpretation(s) would not even avoid the constitutional 
question as they present it. 
 This case is before the Court because the court of 
appeals created a new requirement in the name of the 
nondelegation doctrine–one that demands that guidance for 
administrative action prescribe a quantitative “stopping point” 
for regulation.  U.S. Pet. App. 11a.  The problem for cross-
petitioners and their supporters is that the various 
interpretations of the Clean Air Act they offer do not supply 
such a “stopping point.”51  Nowhere do cross-petitioners 
identify exactly what the cost-benefit balancing they desire 
would entail.  Indeed, they offer the Court a virtual 
smorgasbord of possibilities (ATA Br. 30), ranging from  
analysis “under ‘significant risk’ and similar rubrics” to 
analysis based on “quality-adjusted life years” to the kind of 
cost-benefit analysis endorsed in International Union, United 
Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of 
America, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991), 
which required “identifying values for lost years of human life 
and for suffering and other losses from non-fatal injuries.”  
Id. at 1320.  
 Quite apart from the administrative license created by 
cross-petitioners’ failure to choose among the multitudinous 
ways in which costs can be taken into account in setting 
regulatory standards, none of cross-petitioners’ analytical 
frameworks, even viewed in isolation, identifies a stopping 
                                                 
51Cross-petitioners and their supporters cannot even agree as to 
whether the  Act permits or requires EPA to consider costs in 
setting the NAAQS (compare ATA Br. 32 with Inhofe Am. Br. 10), 
and thus cannot agree as to whether Congress itself made the 
most basic choice inherent in health and safety regulation–whether 
to balance human lives against economic costs.  Cf. Industrial 
Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 
672 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment).  
 
 point for regulation.  An instruction from this Court telling 
EPA to consider quality-adjusted life years rather than lives 
lost, for example, would not tell EPA how many life years it 
should strive to save.  It would, at most, tell the agency not 
to worry quite so much about the effects of air pollution on 
the elderly, the disabled, and the ill. 
 
2. Cross-Petitioners’ Proposed Cost-Benefit Canon 
Cannot Override the Plain Meaning of the Statute and 
Would Improperly Subvert the Legislative Process 
 
 As much as conceding the weakness of their arguments 
based on the statutory language, cross-petitioners and their 
supporting respondents and amici urge this Court to adopt a 
new canon of construction.  ATA Br. 46-47; App. Pwr. Br. 46-
47; GE Am. Br. 18-22.  The plainest statement of the content 
of this new canon appears in General Electric’s brief:  “[A] 
federal agency is required to consider costs and risk trade-
offs in the absence of an express congressional statement 
forbidding the agency from doing so.”  GE Am. Br. 18.  GE 
submits that this new requirement should apply only to 
“environmental and other regulatory statutes.”  Id. at 1. 
 Cross-petitioners and their supporters ask this Court, in 
other words, to adopt a canon of construction that licenses 
the rewriting of a particular category of statutes.  This is a 
radical request, and one this Court should roundly reject. 
 Cross-petitioners’ new canon would have this Court 
ignore the language of the Clean Air Act establishing that 
Congress deliberately excluded the consideration of costs 
from the process of setting the NAAQS.  Because Congress 
did not, three decades ago, foresee this new canon and 
therefore did not then know that it must use certain explicit, 
magic words in excluding the consideration of costs, 
Congress’s work could be undone.  This is not a canon of 
statutory construction at all; it is a canon of statutory 
destruction. 
 Congress itself has, moreover, rejected an interpretive 
principle like the one recommended by cross-petitioners.  
Very recently, Congress considered and rejected bills that 
would have imposed what came to be known as a 
 “supermandate” on agencies charged with protecting human 
health and the environment.  This supermandate, like the 
canon proposed by cross-petitioners, would have applied a 
cost-benefit test to federal regulations.  See H.R. 9, 104th 
Cong. § 422(a)(2), (b)(1) (March 10, 1995); S. 343, 104th 
Cong., § 629(a) (1995).52 
 The question whether to apply a generic cost-benefit test 
to health and environmental regulation is a public policy 
decision of the highest order.  Congress so far has not 
embraced such an across-the-board test.  This Court should 
not wade into these politically charged waters by adopting 
the cost-benefit canon cross-petitioners propose. 
 
II.  Interpreting the Clean Air Act to Preclude the 
Consideration of Costs in Setting the NAAQS Does Not 
Lead to Irrational Results 
 
 At the end of the day, the real complaint of cross-
petitioners and their supporting respondents and amici is 
that the Clean Air Act does not reflect “wise social policy.”  
App. Pwr. Cross-Pet. 7.  Their contention that the law is 
unwise, however, rests on a mischaracterization of the law in 
operation and is belied by three decades of success.  Their 
argument, moreover, fundamentally misapprehends the role 
of this Court in relation to the Congress. 
 
Precluding Cost-Benefit Balancing in Setting the 
NAAQS Will Not Lead to Deindustrialization 
 
 Throughout their briefs, cross-petitioners and their 
supporting respondents and amici suggest that precluding 
the consideration of costs in setting the NAAQS will force 
EPA to set standards for criteria pollutants at zero, thus 
effectively ending industrial activity in this country.  They 
                                                 
52The brief of amici Environmental Defense, et al., provides a 
detailed discussion of the extensive congressional debates over, 
and rejection of, generic cost-benefit tests for federal health and 
environmental regulation. 
 
 believe this result follows from the “nonthreshold” character 
of the criteria pollutants.  Their argument betrays a deep 
misunderstanding of the concept of a nonthreshold pollutant.  
As a consequence, cross-petitioners seriously misrepresent 
EPA’s degree of authority under the statute. 
 Cross-petitioners implicitly embrace a conception of 
nonthreshold pollutants as pollutants that have been shown 
not to have a threshold, that is, pollutants that have been 
shown to have adverse effects on human health or the 
environment at every nonzero level.  This is not EPA’s 
conception of a nonthreshold pollutant. 
 When EPA discusses the possibility that particulate 
matter and ozone are nonthreshold pollutants, it is referring 
to the fact that these pollutants have not been shown to have 
a threshold, that is, it has not been demonstrated that these 
pollutants cease to have adverse effects on human health or 
the environment below a certain level.  EPA does not claim 
to have proven that PM and ozone have adverse effects on 
human health at every nonzero level.  See NAAQS for 
Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856, 38,863 (1997); NAAQS for PM, 
62 Fed. Reg. 38,652, 38,674-75 (1997).  Thus, when EPA 
discusses the possibility that these are “nonthreshold” 
pollutants, it is referring to a lack of evidence that there is a 
threshold. 
 This lack of evidence would not be sufficient to support a 
NAAQS.  The Clean Air Act requires the Administrator to 
present evidence of harm before she may set or revise the 
NAAQS.  She may not set the NAAQS based on the lack of 
evidence of no harm.  Section 108(a)(2) makes this point 
plain: the criteria on which the NAAQS are to be based must 
describe “all identifiable effects on public health or welfare.”  
42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(2) (emphasis added).  Indeed, if EPA 
were allowed to set the NAAQS based on the lack of 
evidence of no harm, there would be no need to develop 
criteria documents at all, because EPA would not be 
required to show health effects before regulating.  In such a 
regime, it would presumably be up to the regulated 
community to show the harmlessness of air pollution, rather 
than being up to the government to show its harmfulness.  
This is not the regulatory regime created by the Clean Air 
 Act.53 
 As a consequence, cross-petitioners’ claim that EPA is 
required to set pollutant levels at zero when faced with a 
nonthreshold pollutant is mistaken.  ATA Br. 25.  EPA is not 
required to set the NAAQS at zero for such pollutants 
because nonthreshold pollutants are not what cross-
petitioners claim them to be; they are not pollutants that 
have been shown to be harmful at all nonzero levels, they 
are pollutants that have not been shown to be harmless at all 
nonzero levels.  Indeed, if EPA did indeed attempt to set a 
NAAQS based on the lack of evidence of harmlessness 
rather than based on affirmative evidence of harmfulness, 
we expect that cross-petitioners would be first in line to 
challenge the agency’s decision. 
 
B.  Precluding EPA from Considering Costs in Setting 
the NAAQS Does Not Allow the Administrator Privately 
to Consider Costs While Publicly Denying It 
 
 Cross-petitioners argue that EPA should be required to 
consider costs in setting the NAAQS because this would 
simply formalize an informal system that has developed in 
which the Administrator privately considers costs in setting 
the NAAQS while publicly denying she is doing so.  ATA Br. 
43-45.  Their evidence for this allegation of unspoken but 
routinized illegality is altogether unpersuasive. 
 In addition to engaging in rank speculation about what 
Administrator Browner’s private thoughts might have been 
during the PM and ozone rulemakings at issue here, ATA Br. 
44, cross-petitioners assert that Administrators Costle and 
Ruckelshaus considered costs in NAAQS rulemakings 
                                                 
53In contrast, in Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American 
Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980), this Court addressed the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s “cancer policy,” 
which presumed that no safe level of carcinogenic substances 
existed and required workplace standards to be set based on this 
presumption.  Id. at 624.  EPA has not adopted this kind of 
presumption in setting the NAAQS. 
 
 undertaken during their tenures at EPA.  But both Costle54 
and Ruckelshaus55 were careful to ensure that their final 
decisions were not based on statutorily proscribed factors. 
 In both instances, to be sure, as cross-petitioners’ 
sources note, the Administrator (or, in Ruckelshaus’s case, 
EPA staff) had before him information on the costs of 
implementing the standards he was in the midst of setting.56  
This demonstrates nothing.  In NAAQS rulemaking 
proceedings, EPA is commonly confronted with information 
on costs even though it has repeatedly denied the relevance 
of this information.57  Moreover, EPA is charged at once with 
setting and with implementing the NAAQS.  As emphasized 
throughout this brief, it is perfectly appropriate for EPA to 
consider costs in implementing the NAAQS.  Because the 
process of implementation begins straight on the heels of 
setting the NAAQS, an Administrator will naturally have 
before her information on the implementation of standards 
even as she sets them.  Indeed, as cross-petitioners have 
emphasized, EPA must issue information on the costs and 
                                                 
54Mark K. Landy, et al., The Environmental Protection Agency: 
Asking the Wrong Questions from Nixon to Clinton 70 (1994).  
Indeed, Costle rejected the standard recommended by economic 
advisors hostile to the Clean Air Act’s prohibition on the 
consideration of costs.  As Landy, whose account of Costle’s 
deliberations forms the basis of cross-petitioners’ speculations, 
summarized it: these economic advisors “could argue about the 
statute as much as they wanted, Costle felt, but they could not 
fault him for following it.”  Id. at 73. 
 
55ATA Br. 44. 
 
56See Landy, supra, at 67-70 (Costle’s decision); Thomas O. 
McGarity, Reinventing Rationality 47-48 (1991) (Ruckelshaus’s 
decision). 
 
57In fact, respondents and amici supporting cross-petitioners obtain 
their outsized estimates of the costs and other consequences of 
the revised PM and ozone NAAQS from comments placed in the 
docket in the rulemakings at issue here.  See App. Pwr. Br. 4, n. 4; 
id. at 18, n. 45; GE Am. Br. 9. 
 
 feasibility of control measures “simultaneously with” issuing 
the criteria documents on which the NAAQS are based.  42 
U.S.C. 7408(b)(1). 
 So long as, in setting the NAAQS, the Administrator 
excludes the cost information from her determination, the 
statutory mandate is satisfied.  There is absolutely no 
grounds in the record before this Court to presume that any 
Administrator has ever violated that clear duty. 
 Equally important, the possibility that an Administrator will 
act unlawfully by considering factors that are statutorily 
proscribed is not reason to rewrite a statute to take account 
of those factors.  If an Administrator were ever to consider 
statutorily proscribed factors in setting a NAAQS, resort 
could be had to the judicial process and to the standard 
allowing an agency action to be overturned if “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”  Administrative Procedure Act, 5 
U.S.C. 706(2)(A). 
 
C.  Congress Acted Rationally in Precluding EPA from 
Considering Costs in Setting NAAQS While Allowing 
EPA to Consider Costs in Implementing Them 
 
 Respondents argue that precluding the consideration of 
costs in setting the NAAQS defeats the public-health 
purposes of the Act by imposing regulatory costs that harm 
people’s health.  App. Pwr. Br. 18.  In addition, cross-
petitioners assert that EPA cannot reasonably maintain a 
distinction between the consideration of costs in setting the 
NAAQS and the consideration of costs in implementing 
them.  ATA Br. 45-47.  Neither claim has merit.  Not only did 
Congress sensibly address the potential tradeoffs between 
regulatory costs and health, but the distinction between 
setting the NAAQS and implementing them has served 
federal air pollution control efforts well. 
 Respondents and amici supporting cross-petitioners seek 
to convince this Court that interpreting the Act to forbid EPA 
to consider the health effects of the economic consequences 
of regulation in setting the NAAQS would be irrational.  In 
fact, their briefs repeatedly suggest that people will die if 
 EPA is allowed to set the NAAQS without balancing costs 
against benefits.  According to the respondents and amici 
supporting cross-petitioners, anywhere from approximately 
3,000 to 27,000 people will die as a result of the costs of the 
revised PM and ozone standards.58 
 There is not one bit of empirical evidence supporting 
these outlandish claims.  Cross-petitioners’ supporters cite 
no empirical study on the effect of the costs of any actual 
regulation on human health, let alone any empirical study on 
the effect of the cost of these standards on human health.59  
Instead, they refer to two sets of controversial studies which, 
based on abstract, theoretical economic models, purport to 
find a generalizable relationship between regulatory costs 
and human mortality.  These studies are filled to the brim 
with controversial assumptions about the income-depressing 
effects of regulation, the effects of wealth on health, and 
even the value of a human life.60 
 Suffice it to say that respondents’ and amici’s unqualified  
assertions about the relationship between the costs of public 
health regulation and public health itself are subject to 
extremely serious empirical and normative criticisms.  
However, this Court is not the forum for resolving these 
complex empirical and normative issues; rather, Congress is 
the “preferable forum for comprehensive investigations and 
judgments of social value.”  Pegram v. Herdrich, 120 S.Ct. 
                                                 
58See Mercatus Center Am. Br. 19 n. 14; App. Pwr. Br. 18. 
 
59Indeed, respondents’ risk estimates  are based on cost estimates 
that themselves are wholly unsubstantiated.  App. Pwr. 18 n. 45. 
 
60Respondents and amici rely on: Ralph L. Keeney and Kenneth 
Green, Estimating Fatalities Induced by Economic Impacts of 
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Cutoff for Safety-Enhancing Regulatons, 37 ECON. INQUIRY 599 
(1999). 
 
 2143, 2150 (2000).  And, in the Clean Air Act, Congress has 
resolved these issues by prohibiting EPA from considering 
costs in setting the NAAQS but allowing the agency to 
consider costs in implementing them.  Indeed, Congress 
specifically provided limited, targeted escape valves allowing 
departures from the requirements of the Act where 
significant economic disruptions or unemployment would 
otherwise result.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.  7410(f)-(g).  This was 
a perfectly reasonable and rational response to the complex 
empirical and normative issues raised by the prospect that 
ceasing economic activity that “endanger[s] public health 
and welfare,” 42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(1)(A), might lead to a loss in 
income. 
 Congress’s distinction between the factors relevant to 
setting the NAAQS and those relevant to implementing them 
is similarly reasonable.  Contrary to cross-petitioners’ claims, 
the Clean Air Act’s NAAQS program has been a large-scale 
success.  From a purely environmental perspective, the 
program has resulted in a substantial absolute reduction in 
emissions of almost all of the criteria pollutants.61   But what 
is most striking is that these reductions have occurred 
alongside significant increases in population and economic 
activity.  The quality of the ambient air Americans breathe 
every day has improved dramatically while the economy has 
expanded and our national wealth has increased.  In the 
absence of the controls imposed by the Clean Air Act, those 
increases in economic activity would undoubtedly have been 
accompanied by a significant worsening of air quality. 
 Even from the perspective of a traditional economic 
analysis, the success of the Clean Air Act cannot fairly be 
gainsaid.  According to EPA’s peer-reviewed economic 
analysis, the reductions in emissions of air pollutants have 
most likely produced trillions of dollars more in benefits than 
they have imposed in costs.62  A congressionally mandated 
                                                 
61See Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves, 
supra, at 280. 
 
62See EPA, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, supra, at 
ES-8. 
 study of the Clean Air Act’s benefits and costs, published 
last year, anticipates that the benefits of the Act between 
1990 and 2010 will exceed the costs by a ratio of 4 to 1.63 
 The Clean Air Act reflects Congress’s central insight that 
the best way to achieve such dramatically positive results 
was not to base the nation’s objectives for environmental 
quality on prospective cost-benefit analysis.  Congress 
understood the pitfalls presented by basing environmental 
objectives on cost-benefit analysis in the first instance rather 
than taking such concerns dynamically into account at later 
stages, while implementing controls to achieve those 
objectives.   
 Because of the proclivity of cost-benefit analysis for 
quantification and commensuration, cost-benefit analysis 
tends to highlight those costs and benefits that can be both 
quantified and stated in terms of a common metric, such as 
dollars.  It follows that cost-benefit analysis tends to 
underrate those things that cannot be so quantified and 
monetized; it tends, in Professor Tribe’s famous formulation, 
to “dwarf[] soft variables.”64 
 This feature of cost-benefit analysis makes it a particularly 
unhelpful analytical framework for setting air quality 
standards under the Clean Air Act.  While a retrospective 
cost-benefit analysis may, like that done with respect to the 
Clean Air Act, demonstrate the wisdom of policy choices 
decades after those choices were made, a prospective cost-
benefit analysis might have discouraged a policymaker from 
making those very same choices in the first instance. 
 On the cost side, for example, it is very difficult accurately 
to estimate the consequences of a technology-forcing 
regulatory requirement before that requirement has forced 
any technology.  It is much easier to assume that the 
                                                                                                    
 
63EPA, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act 1990 to 2010, 
v (1999). 
 
64Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New 
Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 Yale L.J. 1315, 1318-19 & 
n.25 (1974). 
 
 technology used to implement the new requirement will be 
the same as, and cost as much as, the technology that 
existed before the requirement was imposed.  And indeed, 
this is the approach taken by EPA when it has, as it is 
obliged to do by Executive Order, tried to estimate the costs 
of the NAAQS.  With respect to the rules at issue here, EPA 
thought its cost estimates would prove significantly 
overstated because of the likely effects of technological 
innovations.65 But it could not quantify these effects, and so 
they do not show up in its economic analysis. 
 Likewise, with respect to benefits, the empirical and 
normative complexity of quantifying and monetizing the 
benefits of good health, long life, and fresh air are well 
known.  When these benefits cannot be quantified or 
monetized, they do not amount to much in cost-benefit 
analysis.66  Even when they can be both quantified and 
monetized, an important normative shift occurs when the 
analyst begins to ask not how clean must the air be to 
protect public health but how much would citizens pay to 
make it so.67 
 Under the Clean Air Act, then, prospective cost-benefit 
analysis of the kind cross-petitioners endorse would tend to 
have the following effect: it would tend to overestimate costs 
(because it could not adequately account for technological 
innovation) and underestimate benefits (because so many 
important things cannot be counted).  The result would likely 
be a systematic tendency toward underprotection of the 
health and welfare central to the Act. 
                                                 
65See Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Environmental 
Protection Agency, Regulatory Impact Analyses for the Particulate 
Matter and Ozone NAAQS and Proposed Regional Haze Rule at 
9-2 to 9-4 (1997). 
 
66See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1219 
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  Congress decided in the 1970 Clean Air Act to respond to 
the inherent uncertainties of cost-benefit analysis and its 
tendency to compromise environmental objectives by 
excluding its consideration from the setting of NAAQS.  No 
doubt this was “drastic medicine,”68 but Congress had 
declared a “war against air pollution,”69 and it knew that wars 
are not won by setting one’s sights as low as possible. 
 Of course, the question before the Court is not ultimately 
whether the Court believes, as we do, that Congress acted 
wisely in 1970 in deliberately deciding not to compromise its 
national goals for clean air based on cost-benefit analysis.   
For the Constitution wisely entrusts Congress with the 
responsibility for making those important policy 
determinations.  Cross-petitioners’ exclusive remedy 
remains now, as it has been for the past thirty years, in the 
legislature and not the courts. 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed 
insofar as the court held that the Clean Air Act precludes 
EPA from considering costs in setting the NAAQS.
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